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Taxes on Cars and Gasoline to Control of Air Pollution: Suggested Models for Bangladesh 
 
Jamal Nazrul Islam1, Haradhan Kumar Mohajan2, and Joly Paul 3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The main aim of this paper is to investigate some policies that would influence people to drive fewer miles 
and to buy smaller cars, use better pollution control equipment, and cleaner fuel. An attempt has been made 
to quote the vehicle tax rates of Bangladesh. Despite technological advances, the emissions of cars’ still can 
not be measured reliably enough to impose a Pigovian tax. Literature review reveals that the gas tax depends 
on fuel type, engine size and pollution control equipment. A vehicle tax depends on mileage or a combination 
of uniform tax rates on gasoline and engine size with a subsidy to pollution control equipment. This study 
suggested two models, which first considers homogenous consumers and then considers for heterogeneous 
consumers that differ by income and two taste parameters, one for miles and other for vehicle size. Yet 
Bangladesh has not imposed emission taxes on vehicles properly; as a result the air pollutions in large cities 
are increasing dangerously. Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, is one of the dangerously polluted cities of the 
world. The government of Bangladesh should take immediate steps to impose emission taxes on vehicles 
according to guidelines of this paper to apply the taxes on vehicles. 
 
JEL. Classification: E62; H21; H23; I38; Q51; Q53; 
 
Keywords: Vehicle Emission, Pigovian Tax, Social Welfare. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last part of the 20th century and in the beginning of the 21st century the area of cities of the world has 
expanded, and new cities and towns have grown rapidly. As a result in vehicle-miles traveled increases. 
Again, most of the luxurious people like large vehicles which are increasing externalities from vehicle 
emissions. Emissions from vehicles pollute air that worsened human health, diminishing visibility and caused 
global worming (Fullerton and West 2002). The best way is to measure the emission of each vehicle 
efficiently and accurately but yet no cheaper and accurate measurement technology is invented. Actual 
vehicle emissions depend not only on vehicle size and age, but also on qualities of the fuel, maintenance of 
the car’s pollution control equipment (PCE), frequency of cold start-ups, temperature of the air, speed of the 
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vehicle, and aggressive driving (Fullerton and West 2002). More gasoline that is volatile leads to more 
evaporative emissions. The carburetor setting be unchanged, this may reduce emissions of carbon monoxide 
(CO) and hydrocarbons (HC), but can also increase emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx). Burmich (1989) 
finds that for cold start-ups a 5-mile trip has almost three times the emissions per mile trip at the same speed. 
Sierra Research (1994) finds that a car driven aggressively has a carbon monoxide emissions rate that is 
almost 20 times higher than when driven normally. As like Fullerton and West (2002) we investigate some 
policies that would influence people to drive fewer miles and to buy smaller cars, better pollution control 
equipment, and cleaner fuel. 
 
 In our model we first consider homogenous consumers and then consider for heterogeneous consumers that 
differ by income and two taste parameters, one for miles and one for vehicle size. The motorist can reduce 
their fees by repairing their vehicles but not by driving less. Sevigny (1998) incorporates the choice of miles 
with a second-best emissions tax, but this tax requires knowledge of each vehicle’s average emission per mile 
and the accurate measurement of miles traveled. But emissions per mile (EPM) cannot be measured 
perfectly, because it depends on how the car is driven. Miles cannot be measured perfectly, because drivers 
can roll back the odometer.  
 
The efficiency of the emissions tax can be achieved from the homogeneous agents by a set of uniform tax or 
subsidy rates on choices such as fuel use, type of fuel, engine size, vehicle age, and PCE. Heterogeneous 
agents maximize different utility functions, so that they have different choices about miles driven, engine 
size, and vehicle age- three different important determinations of emissions (Fullerton and West 2000, 2010). 
Here we describe all the three choices using general functional forms, and we find that the first-best requires 
that each individual a different rate of tax on each such choice following Fullerton and West (2010), and 
Hoel (1998). Let a car drives m miles, so that total emission is  m·EPM and we treat a tax on those emissions 
as the ideal Pigovian tax. The motorist still has a variety of taxes or subsidies on observable choices such as 
gasoline, engine size, and vehicle age to induce individuals to drive fewer miles, to buy smaller cars, or to 
scrap older cars (Fullerton and West 2010). As a result motorists will encourage buying newer cars but the 
government should take steps to reduce prices of new cars. 
 
2.  MODEL FOR HOMOGENEOUS CONSUMERS 
 
We assume perfect information, perfect competition, and no market failure other than a negative externality 
from emissions for homogeneous consumers (Fullerton and West 2002). Let us consider a simple economy 
consists of n identical individuals each of which owns one vehicle. Each vehicle is composed of some 
attributes that affect emissions (such as engine size, fuel efficiency, and PCE) and other attributes that do not 
affect emissions (such as leather seats or a sunroof). Households buy gasoline to drive miles, and they choose 
among grades of fuel-cleanliness. 
 
They gain utility from driving miles m, the size of the vehicle s, and other goods and services, x. The size s of 
engine is measured as cubic inches of displacement (CID). The consumers may gain or lose utility from 
pollution-control equipment c, and per gallon fuel cleanliness f. Fuel cleanliness is an attribute of gasoline 
such as volatility or oxygenation. Again, household utility is affected by aggregate auto emissions, E. Thus 
the household’s utility function is, 
 
                            u = u (m, s, c, f, x, E )                     (1) 
   
where u is continuous, differentiable and strictly quasi-concave in its first five arguments. 
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EPM = X discharge by a car depends positively on the size and negative on PCE and the clean-fuel 
characteristic i.e., X = X (s, c, f ). Each of the households drives m miles, then aggregate emission E can be 
written as; 
 
                                                                    E = n m X.     (2) 
 
The fuel efficiency is measured drives in miles per gallon (MPG) = Y and depends on engine size and the 
quantity of the clean-car good on the vehicle i.e., Y = Y (s, c). Cars with larger engines get lower gas mileage, 
so that 0

s
YYs . Consumers do not purchase  m  directly, but through the combination they choose 
gasoline (g), size (s) and the clean car good (c), so that; 
 
                        csY
mg
,
 .                                              (3) 
 
Consumers use (3) when they decide vehicle size, vintage and how much gasoline will maximize utility (1). 
The individual is taxed or subsidized on consumption of  m, s, c, f and x. 
 
Let  = price per gallon of gasoline without any clean characteristic, = price per unit of the clean-fuel 
characteristic per gallon. Therefore the total price of a gallon of gasoline is = ( + f ), and the private 
cost of driving one mile is ( + f ) / Y (s, c). Again = price of s, which represents the price of adding 
a CID to an engine, = the price per unit of the clean-air good. For convenience we normalize the price of 
x equals one. The individual problem is to maximize (1) subject to budget constraint; 
gp fp
gp fp
gp fp sp
cp
 
         xcpspmcsY
fpp
y cs
fg 


   
,
.                 (4)  
 
Hence the social planner Lagrangean is; 
 
             L= u (m, s, c, f, x, E ) +   

 


  xcpspm
csY
fpp
y cs
fg  
,
                      (5) 
 
where δ is the marginal social value of income. The first-order conditions with homogeneous consumers for 
maximization are as follows: 
 
                                    


 
csY
fpp
Xnuu fgEm ,
   ,                  (6a) 
 
where bracketed term in (6a) is the total implicit price of a mile.  
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 


  2
 
    
Y
mYfpp
pXmnuu sfgssEs  ,                    (6b) 
 
 where the bracketed term in (6b) is the overall cost per unit of size, including the extra amount that must be 
paid for miles due to the lower MPG caused by the incremental unit of s. 
 
                   
 


  2
 
    
Y
mYfpp
pXmnuu cfgccEc  ,                               (6c) 
 
where the bracketed term in (6c) is the overall cost of PCE, including the extra amount that  must be paid for 
miles due to the lower MPG. 
 
                             



Y
pm
Xmnuu ffEf
 
    ,                      (6d) 
 
where the bracketed term in (6d) is the overall cost per unit of the clean-fuel characteristic.  
 
                                                                        xu .                      (6e) 
 
These first-order conditions say that the marginal social gain from driving another mile, or from an additional 
unit of s, c, f, or x, is equal to the marginal social cost of each. The term  on the left-hand sides of (6a) to 
(6d) reflects the effect on utility of the increment to aggregate emissions from driving an additional mile, 
increasing vehicle size, adding PCE, or cleaner gas. An individual usually does not know that his own 
choices affect aggregate emission but he may face taxes or subsides on its consumption of s, c, f, x and g. The 
household’s budget constraint becomes; 
Eu
  
         fcsXmxcpspmcsY
fpp
y exccss
ffgg ,,  1   
,
 


          (7) 
 
where g  is the tax per gallon of gas, f  is the tax per unit of clean-fuel characteristic, s is the tax per unit 
size, c  is the tax per unit PCE, and e  is the tax per unit of emissions. Hence the household’s Lagrangean 
is; 
  
   ExfcsmuL ,,,,,      
           
 
 
         

 


  fcsXmxcpspm
csY
fpp
y exccss
ffgg ,,  1   
,
   . (8)    
    
The first-order conditions for maximization are as follows: 
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   
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   

 


  sesffggsss XmY
Yfpp
mpu   
 
  2  ,            (9b) 
 
                
   

 


  cesffggccc XmY
Yfpp
mpu   
 
  2  ,             (9c) 
 
                          
 


  fefff XmY
mp
u   
 
  , and                   (9d) 
 
      xxu    1 .                     (9e) 
        
Emissions would be calculated to enter the consumer problem implicitly through the pollution tax e . The 
price per unit mile, and similar emissions tax calculations would be for s, c and f.  
 
2.1   Analytical Calculations for Taxes and Subsides  
 
Now we are interested to calculate Pigovian tax. The tax on emission e , provides the basic efficient policy 
against which alternatives can be compared. Let all other tax rates set to be equals to zero i.e., 
0 xcsfg  . Then (6e) and (9e) imply  xu . Now using    in (6a) we get; 
 
              Xnu
Y
fpp
u E
fg
m   


   .                               (10) 
 
Using the value of  in (9a) we get; mu
  
  


 


  X
Y
fpp
Xnu
Y
fpp
E
fg
E
fg     , 
 
   
nuE
e  .                       (11) 
 
Now we can define (11) as the marginal environmental damages (MED) per unit of emissions; which is the 
usual Pigovian tax, and it is greater than zero so long as 0Eu . Hence Pigovian tax on emissions by itself 
induces households to make all the optimal choices about miles, car size, fuel, and PCE.   
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Now we will calculate gas tax g . For the impossible measurement of gas emission, 0e  and suppose all 
other tax rates be zero i.e., 0 xcsf  , then from (6e) and (9e) we get,    and (9a) now 
becomes; 
 
             

 
YY
fpp
u gfgm
 .                                (12) 
 
From (10) and (12) we get; 
 
           Xnu
Y E
g   , 
 
       csYfcsXnuEg , ,,    ,                            (13) 
 
which represents the additional damage caused by an increase of one gallon of gas. From (13) we see that gas 
tax depends on fuel characteristic f and on the characteristic of the vehicle at the pump (s and c). 
 
Now we will calculate vehicle tax v . If the gas tax cannot depend on characteristics of the vehicle, the 
efficiency outcome can still be attained by a vehicle tax that depends on mileage i.e.,  mvv   . As before 
suppose other tax rates be zero i.e., 0 xcsgf  , and suppose that the Lagrangean of (8) is  
modified by subtracting a tax v  per vehicle. Suppose that all other tax rates be zero, and the vehicle tax 
would be as follows:  
 
          fcsXmnuEv ,,    .                               (14) 
 
Authorities know the cars’ characteristics (s and c) and mileage (m), hence (14) is product of cars’ emission 
m. X (s, c, f ) and Pigovian tax rate, 

 
nuE .  
 
We now solve separate fixed tax rates. This technique applies if none of the above policies are available and 
government can set separate tax rates on gasoline, engine size, and PCE. We assume that the gas tax can be 
made to depend on characteristic of the fuel but not the characteristic of the car.  From (6b) and (9b) we get, 
            

 


 





  2g2s2 m 
 
      
 
  
Y
Y
Y
Yfpp
mpXmnu
Y
Yfpp
mp ssfgssE
sfg
s  , 
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                      s2gm     Y
YXmnu ssE , 
 
                    

 
Y
XYXmnu ssE   s  .                (15) 
 
Here the first term gives the direct damage cased by an increase of one unit of size, which is positive as long 
as emissions affect utility,  0Eu  and size affects emissions, . The second term is an indirect 
effect from an additional unit of size through its effect on fuel efficiency. An additional unit of size decreases 
fuel efficiency, the household knows that an increase in the size of his vehicle engine will cost an additional 
gas tax. Again observe that the two components of the size tax are opposite in size, so that we cannot predict 
the sign of 
0sX
s . Since 0Eu , so that 0s   if  
 
                       
Y
Y
X
X ss  .                              (16) 
 
We now solve PCE  tax rates. From (6c) and (9c) we get for   ; 
  


  2
  
   
Y
Ymfpp
pXmnu cfgccE  =   

  22
 
 
 
 
Y
Ym
Y
mYfpp
p cgcfgcc
 , 
                          
           X
Y
mYunXmun cEcE
c 
                                    (17) 
 
which is analogous to the s . The first term of (17) is negative to reflect the effect on damages of an added 
unit of PCE and the second term is a rebate due to the effect that PCE has no fuel efficiency and hence it is 
negative. So that c  is always negative, that is it is necessarily a subsidy. Since 0e   the subsidy to PCE 
(either in g  or e ) can only induce consumers to buy any such equipment if it is equal to the entire private 
cost of PCE, including both the direct cost  and the extra fuel cost incurred due to the negative effect that 
indeterminate.  
cp
 
3.  MODEL FOR HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS 
 
In this section, we introduce heterogeneity when the optimal tax rates need to differ among consumers. Let us 
assume parameter   to represent the household’s preference for miles and β to represent the preference for 
size of the car. Together with income, these parameters are jointly distributed according to the distribution 
function  h , y,   with positive support on      yy,,,   .  The people who live fur from their 
work place have a high demand for miles ( ), but they may prefer either a large car for comfort and safety 
or a small car for better gas mileage. For heterogeneity we ignore the clean-car and clean-fuel characteristics. 
Hence, fuel efficiency and emissions per mile depend only on size, and each household generates  m X (s) 
units of emissions. The total pollution is; 
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                                     dyddyhsmXE
y


 ,,  
  
 .                               (18) 
 
A household’s utility function is; 
        
                                      ExsmuU   ,;,,                    (19) 
 
where  μ is the household’s change in welfare from additional pollution ( EU  / ). The social planner must 
maximize a measure of social welfare such as a weighted sum of utilities of n households. We divide each 
household’s utility by its own marginal utility of income ( ). If e  is available, we want the maximization 
of our social welfare function to yield the solution of Pigou (1932). Since this solution is based on marginal 
conditions, such as marginal environmental damages, at the optimum, we use the values for    that occur at 
the first-best social optimum ( ). When first-best instruments are not available, we want to be able to find 
second-best uniform tax rates that maximize the same social welfare function. To evaluate  we use the 
prices at the Pigovian equilibrium and weights are calculated as (1/ ). The social welfare function is; 
*
*
*
 
           
    dyddyhExsmuW
y

 ,,  *
,, 
  
 

  .                         (20) 
 
Again the social planner’s budget constraints; 
 
                                     xpmsY
p
y s
g  .                   (21) 
 
The social planner’s problem is to maximize this welfare function subject to a resource constraint, so that the 
Lagrangean is, 
 
        dyddyhdyddyhsXmxsmuL
y y

 
 ,,  ,,   *
,,  
    
  


   
 
               +     






  dyddyhxpmsYpyy s
g 

 ,,    
  
                                  (22)   
                
with respect to each consumer’s   m, s and x. Income plus tax rebates is y, and the marginal social value of 
income is δ. The first-order conditions for household i is as follows: 
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   
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i
i
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p
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1 

,                                           (23a) 
 
where the second term represents the external cost of an additional mile driven by individual i. 
         
             





 

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1
Y
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mpXmn
s
u i
i
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issi
i
i 

,                                   (23b) 
 
where the second term represents the external cost of an additional unit of size purchased by individual i. 
 
                                     



i
i
x
u
*
1
 ,                                                                     (23c) 
 
where each equation represents n first-order conditions, one for each individual i. Also first term in each 
equation represents the individual’s money value of marginal utility from each good. 
 
Now we discuss household problem. A household does not identify that his own emissions add to aggregate 
emissions. The household’s budge constraint is; 
 
                              iieixissii
gg
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y   1   .               (24) 
 
Therefore household problem is to maximize the Lagrangean; 
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with respect to , and . The first-order conditions for maximization are as follows: im is ix
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3.1   Analytical Calculations for Taxes 
 
To calculate Pigovian tax, we set all taxes except e  equals to zero i.e., 0 xgs  . Again we use    
δ =1  in  (23a) and (26a) to equal each other. The household specific variables drop out leaving  
 
                         
 ne  = MED.                                 (27) 
 
This is the first-best uniform Pigovian tax and can be used to identify other first-best gas tax. In the 
heterogeneous-consumer model, this tax is as follows:  
 
                                                      iig sYsXni     .                   (28) 
 
This is similar to homogeneous consumers.  For homogeneous consumers a tax rate per gallon of gasoline 
that depends on the individual’s own choice of car characteristic  is  can optimally influence the 
determinants of emissions. But for the heterogeneous consumers optimally choose different car sizes and 
mileage. Hence each pays a different rate per gallon. 
 
Authorities might be able to impose a tax on each vehicle that depends on a direct measure of , and 
multiply by a measure of mileage, then the vehicle tax be as follows: 
 isX
 
                              iiv msXni                                      (29) 
 
which is similar to the consumer model. It indicates first-best, but the tax amount would differ among 
heterogeneous households. 
 
Assume that the gas tax and size tax can be set at different rates for different consumers, but that they must 
be fixed for each consumer. From (23b) and (26b) we get; 
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Suppose that the first three policies (28) to (30) are calculated above are not feasible, and policy is limited to 
a single uniform rate of tax on gasoline and single uniform rate of tax on engine size or other vehicle 
characteristic. This policy achieves first-best in the homogeneous-consumer model, but not in the 
heterogeneous-consumer model.  Moreover, a greater degree of heterogeneity means greater divergence from 
first-best. For these reasons, we now consider how to set the second-best uniform tax rates on gasoline and 
engine size. 
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4.   SECOND-BEST TAXES ON GASOLINE AND SIZE 
 
In this section, we consider linear second-best size tax rates. So that we must find the single uniform gas tax 
rate that maximize social welfare, taking as given households’ demand for miles, size and other goods and 
services. We assume that producers’ prices are fixed which is equivalent to maximizing this weighted sum of 
indirect utilities; 
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  ,                            (31) 
 
with respect to s  and g . For normalization we set x equals to zero. First-order conditions of (31) are; 
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for i = s, g. 
Using Roy’s identity  s
t
V
s


  (32a) becomes; 
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where the first term in the integral  


 
*
s
 represents the change in welfare from a change in the size tax, 
holding aggregate emissions constant and the second term is the change in utility due to the effect that a size 
tax has on aggregate emissions. 
 
Again using Roy’s identity  g
t
V
g


  (32b) becomes; 
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where the first term is the change in welfare from a change in the gas tax, holding aggregate emissions 
constant and the second term the change in welfare from the effect that a gas tax has on aggregate emissions.  
 
Hence the tax rate on size and gasoline must be set such a way that the aggregate marginal gain in private 
welfare equals the aggregate marginal loss from the effect on emissions. Here X (s) and Y (s) are the major 
determinants of the second-best tax rates. To calculate second-best taxes we take average of all different gas 
tax rates in (28) as follows: 
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Again if we take gas tax rate for the person with average choices then (28) becomes; 
 
                                           sYsXnsg     .                        (36) 
 
Convexity of  X(s)  would mean that increases in size increase emissions per mile at an increasing rate which 
would raise the weighted average using X(si) in (35) relative to the tax rate using average size in (36). Similar 
result is obtained for Y(si). Hence if either function or both are sufficiently convex, then the use of average 
size to calculate the gas tax rate would result in a lower tax rate than the second-best uniform tax rate.  
 
From (30) the average of the size tax rate becomes; 
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Again the size tax for the per person with average choices (30) becomes; 
 
                                     sY
YsXmnXmnms sss     ,   .                                           (38) 
 
Since both s and m are in both equations, the difference between the average size tax rate in (37) and the size 
tax rate using average miles and size in (38) depends both on whether preferences are correlated and on 
whether X(s) or Y(s) is non-linear. For linearity Xs  and Ys be constants, then the first terms do not affect in 
either (37) or (38) but the second term of (38)  must affects, since Ys<0. Again size and miles are negatively 
correlated, who own larger cars drive proportionately fewer miles, and then the use of the average person’s 
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size tax tends to understate the second-best size tax. Finally we can say to maximize social welfare, we need 
a comprehensive empirical investigation of the technologies X(s) and Y(s), the distribution  yh ,,   , and 
behavioral parameters. 
 
5.   VEHICLE TAX RATES OF BANGLADESH 
 
Government of Bangladesh and National Board of Revenue (NBR) can provide from time to time for tax 
collection on certain items or business under presumptive in lump sum in addition to normal tax on relevant 
transaction. Finance Act 2010 approved some such Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) which were issued 
by NBR relevant to presumptive income and are given in tables-1 and -2. The tax rates are quoted from 
Mahmud, Purohit and Bhattacharejee. (2010).  
 
 
 
Size of the vehicle Tax rate in Taka (Tk.),  (Tk.70 = $1) 
 
Motor car up to 1500 cc 
 
Motor car up to 2000 cc 
 
Motor car exceeding 2000 cc 
 
Jeep up to 2800 cc 
 
Jeep exceeding 2800 cc 
 
Micro bus 
  
8,000 
 
10,000 
 
16,000 
 
14,000 
 
18,000 
 
8,000 
 
Table-1: Tax on private cars/jeeps. 
 
 
 
 Registration period up to  
10 years, (Tax rate in Tk.) 
After 10 years  of  
Registration, (Tax rate in Tk.) 
Air conditioned luxury bus 
 
Air conditioned mini bus 
 
Air conditioned taxi 
 
20,000 
 
10,000 
 
7,000 
10,000 
 
6,000 
 
3,000 
 
Table-2: Tax on transports used for hire. 
 
 
Lump sum taxes on vehicles will take advantages those who are polluting the air. The vehicle taxes should be 
fixed depending on car size; engine size and the type of gasoline are used by the motorists. We hope the 
government of Bangladesh will take immediate steps to impose taxes on cars and gasoline properly, so that 
the air pollution can be controlled in future. The old cars, which are polluting the air, must be removed from 
the road.  
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
By two models, we have tried to form a tax on emissions. In the first model we have considered 
homogeneous consumers where we have investigated the combination of a tax on gasoline that depends only 
on the cleanliness of the fuel, a flat rate of tax on engine size, and flat rate of subsidy to PCE and this 
combination of course first-best. In the second model heterogeneous consumers differ by income, tastes for 
miles, and tastes for engine size. We show that if the engine size and driving miles are negatively correlated 
and both X (s) and Y (s) are linear then we would achieve second-best. If the taste for miles is negatively 
correlated with the taste for engine size, then the second-best uniform size tax would exceed the rate using 
means (size and miles). Yet Bangladesh has not imposed emission taxes on vehicles properly; as a result the 
air pollutions in large cities are increasing dangerously. Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, is one of the 
dangerously polluted cities of the world. Hence the government of Bangladesh should take immediate steps 
to impose emission taxes on vehicles. We have tried to give a guideline to apply the taxes on vehicles, so that 
the paper will be helpful to the government and environment analysts of Bangladesh.  
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